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The Internet of Things (IoT) is characterized by the seamless integration of heterogeneous
devices into information networks to enable collaborative environments, specifically those
concerning the collection of data and exchange of information and services. Security and
trustworthiness are among the critical requirements for the effective deployment of IoT
systems. However, trust management in IoT is extremely challenging due to its open
environment, where the quality of information is often unknown because entities may
misbehave. A hybrid context‐aware trust and reputation management protocol is presented
for fog‐based IoT that addresses adaptivity, survivability, and scalability requirements.
Through simulation, the effectiveness of the proposed protocol is demonstrated.
1 | INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a technological revolution in
the world of computing and communication, enabling
advanced services where (physical and virtual) things in mul-
tiple domains (such as industrial, health, commerce, and home)
are increasingly being renewed from isolated systems to net-
worked Internet‐enabled devices. The vision is to connect
heterogeneous things with varying interests and capabilities
together, thus empowering them to collaborate and allowing
people to communicate with them [1]. Reasons for collabo-
ration include the following: (i) things might not be self‐
sufficient and may need services provided by other things to
accomplish their goals/tasks, (ii) things might have limited
knowledge regarding their surrounding environment, and (iii)
things (entities) might have low capabilities in terms of
computation, communication, and memory resources. Exam-
ples of collaboration scenarios include event monitoring using
distributed query processing in wireless sensor network (WSN)
[2, 3], reliable end‐to‐end packet delivery [4], IoT‐based
healthcare solutions [5], production supply chain [4], environ-
mental monitoring [3], and agriculture [6].
IoT refers to dynamic and ever‐evolving open environ-
ments where entities do not necessarily know each other.
Therefore, decision‐making related to selecting an entity for
collaboration is associated with uncertainty and risk. In case of
uncertainty, an entity has a choice between two or more al-
ternatives, cannot confidently predict the consequences of
selecting any specific entity. Let us consider example scenarios.
For example, the service consumer entity (truster) needs to
know which service provider entity (trustee) in the network to
trust for reliable packet forwarding for the routing process. For
checking anomalous measurements or distributed in‐network
maximum temperature computation of a region, the truster
needs to know which neighbouring entities to trust [7–11].
Due to the open environment of IoT, collaboration may
open the door to internal and external attacks that affect the
performance/accuracy of the entire system. Therefore, col-
laborations should be performed on a controlled basis. In this
digital era, trust can be used as a measure to deal with un-
certainty problems. Grandison et al. [12] defined trust as ‘the
firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably,
securely and reliably within a specified context’.
Hard trust relationships are based on cryptographic
mechanisms, which allow external security attacks to be
addressed [13]. The hard trust protects entities from vulnera-
bilities and attacks by, among others, allowing access only to
authorized entities. Entities in IoTmay be resource constrained
and therefore unable to tolerate the load of heavy computa-
tions of cryptography‐based protocols. However, false or
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inaccurate information may be provided by authorized internal
entities. Hard trust mechanisms do not continuously monitor
participating entity behaviour. To ensure trustworthy cooper-
ation between entities, soft security employs social control
aspects to the underlying security mechanism [7, 9–11]. For
example, soft trust can be based on direct experience (direct
trust), trustworthy peer experiences collected during the period
(indirect trust), or both. A trust engine called the Trust and
Reputation Management (TRM) system explicitly computes
the level of trust.
The TRM system gathers information from the entities
that consumed the service regarding the quality of service
(QoS) received and computes the reputations of the entities
that provided the service [7, 8, 14, 15]. In a distributed TRM
system, the service consumer can learn the service provider’s
past behaviour through direct interactions. But if the service
provider does not have sufficient direct interactions with the
specific service consumer, it must rely on an indirect experi-
ence computed from the recommendations obtained from
peers who have already directly interacted with the service
provider [8]. Reputation can be computed based on direct
trust, indirect trust, or both.
Reputation is an assessment based on the trusted party
behaviour during direct past interactions with the trusting
party or/and as reported by peers through recommendations
or third‐party verification. [16]. Reputations of the entities help
to calculate how much these members can be trusted for a
particular service. The behaviour of an entity as a trustee or
recommender may change over time; relying on its past
behaviour only may be dangerous. Therefore, reputations are
continuously recalculated with time. In IoT, entities may use
the TRM scheme for a variety of purposes, such as finding a
reliable walking path [17], accessing e‐health records [6], and
exchanging services [8–11].
The TRM system must be prepared to cope with variable
conditions and malicious entities. One of the important re-
quirements of the TRM system is adaptivity support. Using
TRM to address the adaptivity requirement allow trusters to
determine changes in service providers or recommender
behaviour. In IoT, entities are heterogeneous and part of
multiple self‐interest communities, and the expectation of
reliable reports from them is therefore challenging. To nega-
tively affect the reputation of the good service provider (bad‐
mouthing) or artificially improve the reputation of a bad
service provider (ballot‐stuffing), recommenders might pro-
vide false recommendations. The goal of malicious peers is to
cause harm to specific members of the network or the entire
system (e.g. they may disseminate virus‐infected audio files).
The trust framework must allow the entities to update their
belief sets concerning environmental changes. For example, a
service consumer might form confidence regarding a particular
service provider by trusting it as an optimal choice for a
particular service. Service consumer should be able to deter-
mine the change in service provider behaviour if it is modified.
The reasons for changes in behaviour might be malicious but
alternatively could result from reducing the number of re-
sources (such as battery power). The presented scheme allows
the truster to select the service provider based on its current
behaviour or a combination of both past and present. The
recommenders are required to provide recommendations for a
service provider based on past and current behaviour.
TRM system success depends on its efficiency in accurately
evaluating the trustworthiness of entities as service providers
and as recommenders [7, 8]. The trustworthiness of the entity
as a recommendation source (termed credibility) is an essential
parameter in a trust model. When a malicious recommender
node provides an unfair recommendation, its credibility should
decrease. Such reductions in credibility would allow surviv-
ability to be achieved—that is, malicious users would not be
allowed to significantly impact normal system operations or the
reputation of the service provider. Most existing works on
social IoT (SIoT) [18–21] assume that friends are cooperative
but do not consider the credibility of the friends while
receiving recommendations.
Moreover, some works related to TRM in IoT [19–21]
consider recommender reputation (trustworthiness as a
recommender of a service provider) as a weightage to the
recommender’s service provider recommendation value. Those
authors did not consider that an entity with a good reputation
(trustworthiness) as a service provider is not necessarily a
trustworthy recommender. Furthermore, recommender credi-
bility in their models was not reduced in response to malicious
behaviour by the recommender. In contrast, our work com-
putes an entity’s recommender credibility by considering the
similarity of the truster rating of recommender behaviour with
that provided for the recommender’s peers who provided
recommendations for the same service provider in a similar
context in the same period. The credibility of the malicious
recommender is decreased with each malicious attempt, which
allows service provider trustworthiness to converge to the
ground truth in the presence of malicious nodes.
The problem with TRM systems based on purely distrib-
uted infrastructures [12, 15] is that each entity keeps the in-
formation about a small portion of the entire network [12, 14].
Therefore the information regarding the number of potential
service providers is limited to local knowledge [9, 20]. Because
of the limited local knowledge, the probability of obtaining
service from highly trustworthy service providers available in
the network is low. Searching for a highly trustworthy service
provider by flooding the network is expensive because service
provider behaviour may change over time. TRM systems based
on a centralized trustworthiness evaluation [10, 11, 22] are
confronted with scalability and energy efficiency limitations.
Transmitting raw feedback from every entity (based on a single
interaction) to some destination (centralized server or cloud)
external to the network for storage and trustworthiness eval-
uation may be prohibitively expensive and sometimes not
possible given typical data collection rates, network types, and
network sizes [10, 23].
Compared with cloud computing, fog computing provides
additional capabilities in terms of delay, mobility, scalability,
heterogeneity, and privacy [22, 24]. Fog computing supports
edge computing [25]. Fog‐based IoT allows the division of the
network into subnetworks, each governed by a fog‐node. An
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IoT entity can then register itself with one of the fog servers.
The fog server can be held responsible for aggregating the
information from IoT entities and forwarding it to the cloud.
In IoT, multiple entities might have varying interests related to
the selection of service providers for a specific service, which
requires deciding based on either local knowledge only, global
knowledge, or both. For example, for a low‐priority service
(such as obtaining the current temperature reading), the node
may opt to obtain the service from a provider whose trust-
worthiness is computed using local knowledge (i.e. by
computing direct and indirect trust using a distributed
approach). However, for a high‐priority service, the node may
prefer to obtain the service from a highly reputable network
service provider that can be found using global knowledge
(centralized approach exploiting cloud or fog).
This paper proposes a hybrid trust management frame-
work that allows for trustworthiness evaluation between en-
tities using centralized and distributed approaches. The nodes
perform in‐network processing to address the scalability
requirement in the centralized approach and send only the
fine‐grained values to the fog‐node for evaluation. For global
reputation calculation of IoT devices, the fog‐nodes forward
their computed reputation scores to the cloud. Every node in
the network is made autonomous to select the evaluation
approach based on its requirements, network conditions, and
environment. For example, to obtain services from a very
reputable service provider, the node can contact the fog‐node
in its domain (subnetwork) for a list of potential providers with
high reputations.
To summarize, the contributions of our work include the
following:
1. A trust‐based attack‐resistant trust model for IoT is pro-
posed. It enables an entity’s trustworthiness as a service
provider and credibility as a recommender to be computed.
We have considered the following five trust‐related attacks
that can disrupt the TRM system: self‐promoting, bad‐
mouthing, ballot‐stuffing, opportunistic service, and
discriminatory.
2. The proposed TRM protocol addresses the survivability
requirement by incorporating regulations with credible
sanction options and statistical techniques. The TRM pro-
tocol supports the convergence of the service provider’s
trustworthiness to the ground truth in the presence of
malicious entities.
3. The TRM protocol addresses the scalability requirement by
incorporating temporal in‐network data aggregation scheme
to reduce the overall amount of data uploaded to the fog
servers by IoT entities.
4. Effectiveness of our TRM protocol is demonstrated using
application scenarios related to service composition. A
comparative analysis of our proposed TRM protocol
is carried out against the trust protocols presented in
[9–11, 22].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 discusses the related work, Section 3 presents the system
model, and Section 4 presents the threat model. Section 5
presents the trust management protocol followed by the
experimental evaluation in Section 6. Section 7 discusses future
work and concludes the paper.
2 | RELATED WORK
In this section, we review recently proposed trust management
protocols for IoT systems.
2.1 | Trust and reputation management in
the Internet of Things
Saied et al. [10] proposed a centralized context‐aware trust
management system to manage cooperation among nodes. The
context similarity is computed based on the contextual distance
(each service is assigned a value). A node must submit feed-
back/rating for every service it has received, which may lead to
substantial traffic throughout the entire network. The work
does not consider the adaptive behaviour of the service pro-
vider while computing credibility. The peers who rated a ser-
vice provider as good in the past because of the provision of
good QoS are penalized because of the service provider’s
current bad behaviour. The history of recommendation quality
scores is maintained, which results in substantial storage re-
quirements. In contrast, our work considered recommender j
rating behaviour in computing recommender j credibility. Najib
et al. [17] review the existing literature on trust calculation
methods in IoT.
Shayesteh et al. [23] proposed a centralized context‐aware
trust management scheme for computing entity trust to
manage collaboration among entities. Dempster–Shafer theory
of evidence is used to aggregate recommendations from en-
tities. A node must submit every feedback to the cloud, which
may lead to substantial traffic throughout the entire network.
The work presented in [26] identifies dishonest nodes and
revokes their credentials in the vehicular ad hoc network sce-
nario. The proposed trust model focuses on evaluating the
trustworthiness or credibility of received messages related to
event occurrences. Based on indirect experience, event trust-
worthiness is computed by considering the information attri-
butes such as Location closeness, Data Integrity,
Authentication, and Time closeness.
Mendoza et al. [27] proposed a distributed trust manage-
ment scheme for IoT to mitigate on‐off attacks (alternatively
behaving as a good node and as a bad node). The node is
punished with more than the reward for not providing a ser-
vice. For each service, the rating assigned is based on the
importance of the service in terms of the amount of processing
and energy requirements.
Gu et al. [28] proposed a trust management architecture
divided into three layers: sensor, core, and application. For
specific purposes, trust management is performed at each layer.
The sensor layer collects information from the physical world.
The core layer connects the sensor layer to the application
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layer. The application layer is used to process and store in-
formation. The parameters considered for trust evaluation
include (i) trust on the sensor layer, (ii) trust on the core layer,
and (iii) trust on the application layer. Formal semantics and
fuzzy set theory are used for the realization of the trust
mechanism.
Hussain et al. [22] presented for fog‐based IoT context‐
aware feedback and feedback crawler system. Experimental
evidence related to addressing reliability, adaptive behaviour,
and survivability requirements is not provided.
J. Yuan et al. [24] proposed a feedback information fusion
algorithm to assess edge devices based on objective informa-
tion entropy theory [25]. The presented scheme does not
compute the reputation of IoT devices. The trust components
considered include (i) interactions with devices and (ii) the
service quality provided by the edge device. The trust evalua-
tion is performed on edge devices. The agent is responsible for
aggregating the direct trust and the trustee device’s feedback
trust. In this approach, a scalability issue arises due to increased
bandwidth requirements. Moreover, in the case of resource‐
constrained IoT, this approach may result in the network
longevity issue. Furthermore, in this work, no experimental
evidence is provided to address adaptivity and survivability
requirements.
Truong et al. [29] presented a feedback‐based trust evalu-
ation model. Like [30], the work focuses on using knowledge,
recommendation, and reputation as trust indicators. The au-
thors described the metrics to be used to derive these three
trust indicators. The work suggested that service providers be
selected based on a community of interest and cooperativeness.
How the three trust indicators will be aggregated is not well
explained. Furthermore, in this work, no experimental evi-
dence is provided.
Kowshalya et al. [31] presented a distributed trust model.
The work assumes that the node having higher residual
energy in a group of peers should be considered malicious
(that carry out ON/OFF selective forwarding attack).
Moreover, the scheme’s efficacy related to the resilience of
the proposed trust model against trust‐related attacks is not
presented.
In [32], a trust management scheme is presented for
efficient service composition in IoT environments without
considering social relationships. Direct trust between service
consumer and recommender is considered as a recom-
mender’s credibility. A rating similarity (RS) measure is used
to calculate the recommender credibility for those cases with
no direct trust between the recommender and service con-
sumer. The scheme requires each feedback to be sent to edge
nodes for trust calculation. A service provider’s trustworthi-
ness score is updated after every interaction. The presented
scheme requires reduced recommender credibility within
some threshold to achieve service provider survivability. If a
recommender provides a recommendation score lower than
the computed trustworthy score, its credibility is decreased.
Otherwise, if the recommender provides a higher recom-
mendation score than the computed trustworthy score, its
credibility increases.
2.2 | Trust and reputation management in
the social Internet of Things
To fully achieve an effective social network of intelligent ob-
jects called the SIoT, there exists work that addresses funda-
mental aspects [30, 33, 34]. In [35], the authors reviewed key
components of SIoT including architecture, and trust man-
agement. This work also provided a comprehensive overview
of the SIoT environment and related challenges.
Xiao et al. [18] presented a trust model based on guarantor
and reputation for SIoT environments. The centralized server
stores the ratings from the entities (objects) and computes the
reputations of the objects. Upon the provision of good‐quality
service, the service provider is assigned some credits. If the
service provider acts maliciously, then it must give some
credits. The reputation computed for each object by the server
is stored in the object and can later be updated using the agents
(that request the reputation server).
Bao et al. [19] proposed a dynamic trust management
system for IoT considering social relationships. Objects or
nodes have specific owners. The relationships considered
among objects and owners include (i) Friendship, (ii) com-
munity, and (iii) ownerships. Trust is calculated based on
honesty, cooperativeness, and community of interest. In this
work, the proposed protocol’s resilience to attacks on the TRM
system has not been proven by evaluations. The proposed
TRM system for the specific IoT environment considers only
WSNs.
Bao et al. [9] proposed a trust protocol for IoT that im-
proves on [19]. Trust evaluation is based on honesty, cooper-
ation, and a community of interest. Network nodes are divided
into diverse communities based on interest. The work assumes
that nodes belonging to a community will have the same social
interests, which may not always be true. A new storage man-
agement strategy is proposed to meet the scalability
requirement.
Chen et al. [20] proposed a trust management system for
service composition in a service‐oriented architecture‐based
IoT system. The work only considers the social relationships
between their owners and does not consider social relation-
ships between objects. All the devices owned by the same
person are assigned similar trust values. Moreover, the char-
acteristics of the different devices must affect the trust value.
Users/owners compute their own trust values for devices. The
work assumes the availability of a high‐end device for every
user, which cannot be guaranteed in every network.
Chen et al. [21] presented an adaptive trust management
protocol. The protocol presented in the work identifies the
best protocol settings considering two design parameters, α
and β. Parameter α represents the trade‐off between recent
direct trust and past direct trust, whereas parameter β repre-
sents the trade‐off between recent indirect trust and past in-
formation. A look‐up table is maintained and populated at a
static time, listing the best settings for the two parameters over
a range of input parameter values. Chen et al. [36] presented a
trust management scheme for efficient service composition in
SIoT environments. The scheme considered both QoS
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(reputation and available energy) and social relationship factors
[21] for trust composition.
Most of the work [9, 18–21] done in this area considers
social relationships as a measure of the trustworthiness of a
node as a recommender. The work assumes that friends are
cooperative, and the cooperativeness value is computed as the
ratio of the number of common friends and the total number
of friends. Moreover, the trustworthiness between objects is
measured by exploiting the social relationship between the
object owners in a transaction. However, objects can build
their own social networks that may differ from and be inde-
pendent of their owners’ social networks. None of the existing
works consider the credibility of friends when receiving
recommendations.
Nitti et al. [11, 37] presented two approaches related to
trustworthiness management in the SIoT: subjective and
objective. In the subjective trust model, each node computes
the trust of its friend based on its own experience and rec-
ommendations from friends. In the subjective approach, each
node manages the feedback from other nodes and stores such
information for trust calculation. In the objective trust model,
feedback information regarding every node is distributed and
stored in a dynamic hash table structure. All nodes can view
this information, but only a few special nodes known as pre-
trusted objects manage this information.
In [11], the credibility of a recommender node is calculated
based on parameters including the trustworthiness of a service
provider, computational capability, relationship factor and
number of transactions. In [37], a recommender node’s cred-
ibility is calculated based on parameters including the centrality
and direct trust of the recommender as well as the number of
transactions. In the objective approach, a node must submit
feedback for every service it has received. The scheme pre-
sented in [11, 37] for computing credibility is not impacted by
his/her malicious behaviour as a recommender. Therefore,
these schemes cannot achieve survivability.
Tormo et al. [38] designed a prototype system that
dynamically selects a suitable reputation computation engine
based on system conditions (such as the number of users,
available bandwidth, available storage capacity, and number of
feedbacks received) and required performance metrics.
In IoT, service provider reputation is computed based on
providing lightweight service. The computation cannot be
considered the same for high‐weight service that requires more
resources and increased availability. Reputation context can
enhance systems by providing better granularity. Existing
works [10, 30] consider the context awareness of the trust
model in computing the trustworthiness of the service pro-
vider based on the type of service provided. Like the work
presented in [10, 30]. The emphasis is on the computation of
the service provider’s reputation based on the type of service
offered. Truong et al. [30] presented a trust model that con-
siders three metrics: reputation, recommendation, and knowl-
edge. The knowledge trust metric is divided into two
subontologies, human‐to‐human and human‐to‐device.
Ontology is used to represent user knowledge that may not be
appropriate for limited‐resource objects.
Abderrahim et al. [39, 40] presented context‐based
centralized trust management system for SIoT. In [40],
context represents the type of service. For trust evaluation and
QoS, three types of relationships are considered: system, social,
and community based. Furthermore, the efficacy of the TRM
system in terms of dynamic node behaviour and addressing
attacks is not shown. Abderrahim et al. [39] assumed that each
social community would be distinguished from others based on
social interests and location. Each community will have an
admin as the central entity and is responsible for computing
and storing trust values of objects sharing the same commu-
nity. The work uses Dirichlet distribution to compute trust at
the admin level. A prediction model based on the Kalman filter
is used to prevent on–off attacks. In this work, a node is
considered malicious if it leaves the community without admin
permission.
Gai et al. [41] presented a trust management system for the
Social Internet of Vehicles (SIoVs). To address trust information
tampering stored locally, the truster and the service provider,
with the signature of central trusted authority, store the trust‐
related information (cookie ) locally. The direct trust is
computed using rater cookie, centrality, and relationship infor-
mation. To compute the indirect trust, firstly, direct trust towards
service the trust‐related information (cookie) is stored locally
provider and each recommender mentioned in cookies (pro-
vided by service provider) is computed by truster. Later, indirect
trust is computed as the ratio of the summation of direct trust
between service providers and recommenders to the summation
of direct trust between service consumers and recommenders.
Jayasinghe et al. [42] presented a flow‐based trust man-
agement system using the page rank [43] model. The work
assumed that if two entities are linked, they have a relationship
regardless of trust. This assumption is used to generate a
weighted directed graph where edges represent the relation-
ships among objects and vertices represent objects. In this
work, if the number of outgoing links exceeds a certain
threshold, the entity is considered a trustworthy entity. The
recommendation value of an entity is calculated as the sum of
the number of incoming links.
In [44], the authors focus on key challenges in designing
trust management for SIoVs. Existing related literature is also
reviewed. Moreover, the work provides a vision of using new
technologies to design efficient SIoV trust models.
In [45] design of the trust management platform is pre-
sented for the SIoT environment. The authors suggested
components for trust information collection and management,
including analytics. The authors also proposed a generic
reference model for IoT, which is comprised of four planes: (i)
IoT trust and security plane, (ii) physical IoT plane, (iii) social/
cyber IoT plane, and (iv) IoT management plane.
3 | SYSTEM MODEL
Like approaches defined in [17, 22, 24, 27, 31], we consider an
IoT system where an entity can be resource constrained
(equipped with limited storage) and, therefore, cannot store the
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complete set of trust values towards other entities and the
services they offer over the long period. A resource‐
constrained entity in IoT can maintain information (reputa-
tion, services, credibility) for the limited neighbours that lie in
its allowed neighbourhood. For better management, scalability,
and efficiency, the network is assumed to be divided into many
subnetworks. Each subnetwork contains a resource‐full fog‐
node (referred to as a kingpin node) and a set of entities, as
shown in the system model presented in Figure 1. The entities
form a connected graph with inter‐connect topologies between
them. Wired, wireless, and optical networking facilities can be
exploited to construct such topologies. A kingpin node is
installed at the close location that covers a specific spatial re-
gion and processes data gathered close to the network’s edge.
IoT entities located in a specific spatial region register with the
kingpin node responsible for that region. All kingpin nodes
work as subnetwork controllers (shown in Figure 1) that have
trust relationships. They share information upon request and
with cloud services provided in their subnetworks and the
service provider’s reputation information. Moreover, upon
request, kingpins also share the reputation scores of service
providers providing a specific service.
When a service consumer requires service, it can check
whether any of the peers (located close by) are offering the
service. In the case of non‐availability of the required infor-
mation locally, an entity can ask its peers for the service
providers providing the required service. If it does not
receive enough recommendations or the service provider
reputation recommended by its peers is not up to the mark,
the service consumer can request the kingpin node for which
it registered for a service provider with a high reputation that
provides the required service. Moreover, for better accuracy
and the case that the service consumer entity is not resource‐
constrained, it can request the local kingpin node directly
instead of relying on local knowledge collected from neigh-
bours in its peers’ range. The service consumer is responsible
for rating the service provider after receiving service, even if
the consumer is associated with another kingpin (e.g. fog‐
node B), and sharing the information with its domain
kingpin, which in turn is held responsible for sharing the
information with the kingpin B.
Moreover, in IoT, each entity can voluntarily join or leave
the subnetwork. In such a scenario, after an entity has regis-
tered its services with the kingpin in the target subnetwork, it
can provide the ID of the kingpin in the subnetwork to which
it was previously registered. Kingpins in the target subnetwork
can obtain the reputation of an entity from the cloud centre by
providing information about the kingpin to which the node
was previously registered.
After the expiry of every recent evaluation period, the IoT
entities share the trust table containing the direct trust value
for each service provider with which it interacted during the
evaluation period. The kingpin receives the fine‐grained values
(representing direct trust) from the service consumers
regarding a service provider in a specific context instead of
sending feedback after every transaction. Let us suppose there
are n service consumers who have taken service s1 one or
more times from service provider j in the evaluation period ep.
At the expiry of ep, each service consumer computes the
recommendations (based on direct trust) and transmits them to
the kingpin. The kingpins are held responsible for computing
the current reputation of the service providers at the subnet-
work (fog) level, based on the fine‐grained information
received. Instead of uploading all the data received from the
nodes indiscriminately, only the fine‐grained information,
including the current reputation of the service providers and
credibility of service consumers, is uploaded from fog‐nodes to
the cloud for further analysis. The cloud is held responsible for
computing the global reputations of service providers and
updating the credibilities of consumers. The cloud provides
such global scores to the kingpins (fog‐nodes) with which the
IoT nodes are currently registered.
In the work presented in [10, 22, 24, 28, 37, 38], designated
resource‐full node in the subnetwork is responsible for the
following: (i) providing trustworthiness value of the service
provider, (ii) trustworthiness evaluation, (iii) providing list of
nodes offering the specific service. Feedback data is pushed
continuously to the central location. The feedback data arrival
rate is sometimes high. Therefore, in this approach, a scalability
issue arises due to increased bandwidth requirements. More-
over, in resource‐constrained networks (such as WSNs), this
approach may result in the network longevity issue and raise
packet loss risks due to collisions.
In the case of resources constrained network, communi-
cation is the most expensive compared with computation.
Therefore, rather than sending raw feedback to the kingpin
node, finer‐grained information should be returned by the
nodes (service consumers) in the network. In this paper, each
node must share with the kingpin the direct trust of the service
provider computed based on the QoS received over the cur-
rent evaluation period.
4 | THREAT MODEL
This paper deals with trust‐related attacks that can impact the
TRM system [32]. We made realistic assumptions about mali-
cious behaviour of entities in the IoT environment (are in line
with existing literature such as [10, 22, 24, 27, 28, 38]). We
assume no link between a highly reputed service provider and
its likelihood of being a target in the system. Instead, each
service provider has the same likelihood of being targeted.
Moreover, an entity with a good reputation as a service pro-
vider might not act as a good recommender. A malicious entity
as a service provider can provide false information by lying
about its reputation level. With a certain probability or for
certain interactions, a misbehaving recommender entity may
provide false recommendations randomly to increase or
decrease the reputation of a service provider.
In addition, we allow malicious (misbehaving) service
consumers to assign unfair ratings. Service providers may
provide service with varying quality over time or periodically.
The reasons for a change in behaviour might be malicious
intent or a reduction in the number of resources (such as
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battery power). We considered the following five trust‐related
attacks that can disrupt the TRM system.
1. Self‐promoting attack: A malicious service provider artifi-
cially promotes its importance by making good recom-
mendations for itself as the service provider selection, but
this can result in poor or faulty service after selection.
2. Bad‐mouthing attack: A bad‐mouthing attack occurs when
dishonest service consumers provide bad recommendations
to try to harm the reputation of a well‐behaved service
provider and reduce its chances of being chosen by other
IoT entities. In addition, multiple malicious IoT entities (as
recommenders) can collaborate to ruin the service trust-
worthiness of the good service provider.
3. Ballot‐stuffing attack: A ballot‐stuffing attack occurs when
service consumers try to boost the service provider’s
reputation by providing unfairly high recommendations.
The aim is to increase the chances of its selection from
other IoT entities for a specific service. In addition, multiple
malicious IoT entities (as recommenders) can collaborate to
boost the service trust of each other.
4. Opportunistic service attack: To deploy an attack once a
reputation is gained, a malicious service provider builds a
good reputation by having fair interactions initially. After-
wards, service providers abuse the earned reputation by
acting maliciously only on specific occasions. Service pro-
viders may provide service with varying quality over time or
periodically or randomly. Moreover, with a good reputation
score, the malicious service provider can effectively collude
with other malicious entities to carry out attacks.
5. Discriminatory attack: A malicious entity discriminates
against certain entities. While serving as a recommender, the
victim service provider offers a bad service recommenda-
tion even if good service has been provided. On the other
hand, for the non‐target service providers, the recom-
mender provides good service recommendations even if
they provide bad service.
5 | TRUST MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
In various applications, such as stock market data, WSNs
feedback in the electronic communities, data may take the
form of a stream of values [2]. In electronic communities,
service consumers take services from a service provider over
time, resulting in a stream of ratings (representing the QoS
received from the service provider). The stream is unbound. A
sliding bounded window is assumed to be defined across the
data stream to deal with this problem. The evaluation domain
is narrowed using the concept of windows. In this work, we
F I GURE 1 Kingpin (fog) nodes as subnetwork controllers
JABEEN ET AL. - 7
have considered the time‐driven scheme to update the trust
score. The trust score is updated after a specific period.
In our work, ratings given by the service consumer during
direct interactions in the context Cx are stored in the recent time
window represented by tr. For time window tr the dimension is
of the form FROM Start TO End. The window size is repre-
sented using time units (such as HOURS). Let t represent the
duration of the evaluation period. Let T dði; j;Cx; trÞ represents
the direct trust computed by i for the service provider j, in the
context Cx based on the ratings in tr (computed using Equa-
tion 4). Direct trust score is updated (using Equation 1) after the
expiry of tr, representing direct trust on the service provider
based on the previous and current behaviour.
Let t0 represents the previous evaluation period at which
the trustworthiness value of a service provider is updated.
T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ is updated after the expiry of tr (Equation 1).
Entities may have limited memory, and therefore it is not
possible to store every piece of feedback. Due to this constraint,
they only store the entity reputations and the ratings given to
service providers based on the QoS received in tr. Initially (at the
expiry of the first evaluation period), the service provider is
assigned a default trustworthiness score [9] which is used as the
value of T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ in Equation (1). At the expiry of every tr,
service consumer i updates T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ using Equation (1).
T dði; j;Cx; trÞ is flushed to T dði; j;Cx; tr−1Þ; and T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ
is updated Equation (1). The contents in tr are flushed to make it
ready for the next evaluation period:
T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ¼ δ T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ
þ ð1 − δÞ T dði; j;Cx; tr−1Þ
ð1Þ
T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ represents the direct trust score of the service
provider based on its past behaviour. δ is a weighting factor, the
value of which lies between 0 and 1. The weighting factor δ is
used to give weightage to the direct trust computed at t0 and tr−1,
while updating the direct trust of the service provider at t0.
5.1 | Direct trust calculation by IoT nodes
TheQoS received from the service provider (in an interaction) is
rated in the continuous range [0–1]. The rating represents the
service consumer’s level of satisfaction related to the service
received from the service provider. The ratings given by the
service consumer in the tr boosts or reduces the corresponding
trust value of the service providers accordingly. The direct trust
is computed based on the contents in the recent time window
(tr). Using the concept of quantiles [46], we have divided the
continuous rating range [0, 1] into equal‐sized subsets to rank the
ratings and recommendations provided by the entities.
The service consumer can rate the QoS received in tr as
Satisfied (S) or Dissatisfied (DS). Sand DS can be classified
as High (H), Medium (M), or Low (L) as shown in Figure 2.
For highly satisfied service (SH) the quality rating is assigned
in the range (>0.83 and ≤1). Moreover, for service quality
classified as medium satisfied (SM), the rating can be
assigned in the range (≥0.67 and ≤0.83), and for low
satisfied service (SL), the quality is in the range SL (≥0.5
and ≤0.67). For highly dissatisfied (DSH), the service rating
assigned lies in the range (≥0 and <0.17); for medium
dissatisfied (DSM), the rating assigned lies in the range
(≥0.17 and <0.34); and for low dissatisfied (DSL), the rating
lies in the range (≥0.34 and <0.5).
After the expiry of t, the outcome of the interactions with
QoS classified as S (OS(i, j, Cx, tr)) and outcome of the in-
teractions with DS (ODS(i, j, Cx, tr)) are calculated via Equa-
tions (2) and (3), respectively:
nSH þ nSM þ nSL ¼ nS





















In this trust model, the context represents a specific type of
service. SH(int) denotes that the QoS received in the interac-
tion int (in tr) is classified as SH. nSH represents the total
number of SH based on the outcomes of interactions; nDSH is
the total number of DSH. nS and nDS represent the total
number of S and DS interactions. The direct trust of i on j for
context s1 is calculated in Equation (4), where ρ is the
weighting factor to weight OS(i, j, s1, tr) and ODS(i, j, s1, tr). ρ
ranges between [0, 1]. T dði; j;Cx; tÞ represents the direct trust
of service consumer i on the service provider j (5), computed
based on its current ððT dði; j;Cx; trÞÞ and past behaviour
ððT dði; j;Cx; t0ÞÞ:
T dði; j; s1; trÞ ¼ ρOSði; j; s1; trÞ
þ ð1 − ρÞ ODSði; j; s1; trÞ
ð4Þ
where ρ + (1 − ρ) = 1, and α + (1 − α) = 1.
T dði; j;Cx; tÞ ¼ α T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ
þ ð1 − αÞ T dði; j;Cx; trÞ
ð5Þ
A node is autonomous in making decisions regarding
how to calculate the reputation of a service provider
considering the network conditions and other requirements.
Consider an example scenario in which i has direct in-
teractions greater than the threshold θD with j in tr; then, to
meet the energy efficiency requirement, it can decide to
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calculate the reputation based on the direct trust only. If i has
fewer interactions than the threshold θD with j, then it can
calculate the indirect trust on j by collecting recommenda-
tions from neighbours who have interacted with the j in the
context Cx.
If the number of peers with good credibility scores is
greater than θID, i can calculate the indirect trust on service
provider j based on the received recommendations. After-
wards, it can compute reputation based on direct and indirect
trust (10). For better accuracy, or if the number of good
credibility recommenders is less than θID, then node i can
query the kingpin node for the trustworthiness score of service
provider j (17). Moreover, if a service consumer wants to
obtain service from a service provider with a high reputation
that is not available in its range or peers’ range, it can ask the
kingpin node.
5.2 | Indirect trust calculation by IoT nodes
The existing IoT‐related works related to TRM systems
consider time‐sensitivity requirements and support giving
different weights to the trustworthiness calculated for the
recent period and previous period. In the existing literature
related to TRM for IoT, the recommenders only provide the
single recommendation value computed based on current
and past transactions upon request. Based on the reputation
score provided, it does not reflect clearly whether the ser-
vice provider is currently providing good‐quality services or
whether it has provided high‐quality services in the past.
Moreover, it also does not reflect whether the service pro-
vider is currently providing the service or not. Our trust
framework allows the entities to update their belief sets for
environmental changes. The scheme presented requires the
recommender node to provide two trustworthiness scores of
the service provider based on current performance and past
performance.
Upon receiving a request for an indirect trust calculation
from the service consumer i, the recommender node k is
required to provide two scores of service provider j: one
representing the direct trust on j computed based on the rat-
ings provided to j in the recent time window ðRT dðk;j;Cx;trÞÞ and
the other representing its reputation (computed based on its
direct and indirect trust) ðRTði;j;Cx;tÞÞ updated during the last
evaluation period. Our trust mechanism requires recom-
menders to send the service provider’s recent direct trust score
ðRT dðk;j;Cx;trÞÞ to monitor the service provider’s current
behaviour, meet adaptivity requirements, and address TRM
system attacks (such as opportunistic and discriminatory
attacks).
F I GURE 2 Continuous range [0, 1] used for rating the received QoS from trustee is divided into equal‐sized subsets
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5.2.1 | Credibility computation for recommender
entities
Our scheme incorporates a mechanism to compute recom-
mender entity credibility and achieve survivability against trust‐
based attacks such as bad‐mouthing and ballot‐stuffing. The
credibility of the malicious recommender is decreased with
each malicious attempt, which allows converging the trust-
worthiness of the service provider to the ground truth in the
presence of malicious nodes. The goal of malicious peers is to
cause harm to specific members of the network or to the entire
system. Upon receiving direct trust value ðRT dðk;j;Cx;trÞÞ (part of
recommendation) from a recommender k about the service
provider j; rank is assigned to the received direct trust value
according to Table 1. For example, if for j, k provides the
current direct trust value 0.83, then it will be ranked as 5.
By default, the credibility of a recommender node is 0.5.
Recommender credibility is computed and maintained by the
service consumer to determine the trustworthiness of the
recommendation provided by the recommender. The credi-
bility of the recommender helps in addressing bad‐mouthing
and ballot‐stuffing attacks. The credibility of an entity as a
recommendation source is updated based on its recent
behaviour as a recommender. The credibility of a malicious
recommender is decreased with each malicious attempt, which
allows for the convergence of the trustworthiness of the ser-
vice provider to the ground truth in the presence of malicious
nodes.
To compute the credibility of a peer k, k’s direct trust
(based on tuples in tr) on service provider j is compared with
(i) the service consumer i direct trust (based on tuples in tr) on
service provider j, and (ii) also with the average of direct trust
scores received from other peers representing the QoS pro-
vided by j to them at tr in the context Cx. If the rating
behaviour is similar (in the acceptable range) to that from the
service consumer or to the average of the direct trust scores
provided by the peers who rated the service consumer for a
similar context and period, then the credibility of the recom-
mender is increased by some points. Otherwise, points are
deducted from the credibility as a forfeiture payment. The
points to be credited or debited from the credibility of the
recommender depend on the extent of the rating behavioural
difference.
Let us consider a scenario. Service consumer i has
computed the direct trust value T dði; j; s1; trÞ for service pro-
vider j based on direct interactions taking service s1. To
compute the indirect trust related to j for context s1, it
takes recommendations from nodes m ðfRT dðm;j;Cx;trÞ;
RT ðm;j;Cx;tÞgÞ, aðfRT dða;j;Cx;trÞ; RT ða;j;Cx;tÞgÞ, bðfRT dðb;j;Cx;trÞ;
RT ðb;j;Cx;tÞgÞ,cðfRT dðc;j;Cx;trÞ;RT ðc;j;Cx;tÞgÞ, and dðfRT dðd;j;Cx;trÞ;
RT ðd;j;Cx;tÞgÞ. Upon receiving recommendations from entities
m, a, b, c, and d; entity i will update the credibility ofm, a, b, c,
and d. Upon receiving (RT dðm;j;Cx;trÞ;RT dða;j;Cx;trÞ;
RT dðb;j;Cx;trÞ; RT dðd;j;Cx;trÞ; RT dðc;j;Cx;trÞÞ ranking will be
assigned as given in Table 1. e.g. if RT dða;j;Cx;trÞ lies in the range
(>0.83 and ≤1), it will be ranked as 4. The credibility updating
of recommender a by service consumer i is performed as
follows.
Step 1 Upon receiving ðRT dða;j;Cx;trÞÞ from a as a
recommendation, service consumer i computes the
absolute difference between the ranking categories,
where the direct trust value given by i and a is repre-
sented by RSi,a = ABSðDif f ðRankðT dði; j; s1; trÞ;
RankðRT dða;j;Cx;trÞÞ). Ranking categories are presented
in Table 1.
Based on the RS of a with i (RSi,a), the credibility of
recommender a is credited or debited with some points. If the
difference between the rating categories represented by RSi,a is
zero, the credibility of the recommender a will be increased
with a threshold ðζ1Þ. If the RSi,j is 1, a credibility will be
decreased with ζ2 points. If the RSi,j is 2, a credibility will be
decreased by ζ3 points. If the RSi,j is 3, it will be decreased by
ζ4 points: Otherwise, with a threshold ζ5.
RSTrustorðT dði; j; cx; trÞ;RT dða;j;Cx;trÞÞ in Equation (7) repre-
sents the RS between i and a.
Step 2 Service consumer node i computes the average
ðuRT dðj;Cx;trÞÞ of all the recommendations (direct trust
scores only) received from neighbour recommenders
(except j and a) for service provider j in the context Cx
(Equation 6). To address self‐promoting attacks, the
service provider j recommendation for itself is not
considered. Furthermore, to deal with a discriminatory
attack recommendation provided by the recommender
a is also not considered, while computing the mean of
recommendations (direct trust scores only) made by
the peers of i. To address self‐promoting attacks, self‐






nRT d ði;j;Cx ;tr Þ
ð6Þ
Service consumer node i then computes the absolute dif-
ference between the ranking categories where the recommen-
dation (direct trust) given by a and uRT dðj;Cx;trÞ lie, represented
TABLE 1 Recommendation and direct trust score rank table
Rank Range
1 (≥0 and <0.17)
2 (≥0.17 and <0.34)
3 (≥0.34 and <0.5)
4 (>0.83 and ≤1)
5 (≥0.67 and ≤0.83)
6 (≥0.5 and ≤0.67)
10 - JABEEN ET AL.
by RSa;uRT d ðj;Cx ;tr Þ ¼ ðABSðdif f ðRankðR
T dða;j;Cx;trÞÞ; Rank
ðuRT dðj;Cx;trÞÞ)).
Based on the rating behaviour similarity ðRSa;uRT d ðj;Cx ;tr ÞÞ,
the credibility of recommender a is credited or debited with
some points (represented by ðRS PeersAV GðRT dða;j;Cx;trÞ;
uRT dðj;Cx;trÞÞÞ in Equation 7). If the difference between the
rating categories is zero, the credibility of recommender a will
be increased with a certain threshold of ðζ1Þ points. If the
difference is 1, it will be decreased by ζ2 points. If the dif-
ference is 2, it will be decreased by ζ3: If the difference be-
tween categories is 3, the credibility of recommender a will be
decreased by ζ4 points. Otherwise, it will be decreased with a
threshold ζ5.
The credibility of the recommender a is updated as shown
in Equation (7). The value of τ lies between 0 and 1. If the
trustworthiness value based on direct trust is not computed in
the current time window, the value of τ is assumed to be zero:
Cra ¼ τ RSTrustor
�
T dði; j; cx; trÞ;R T dða;j;Cx;trÞ
�
þ ð1 − τÞ RS PeersAVG
�
RT dða;j;Cx;trÞ; uRT dðj;Cx;trÞ
�
ð7Þ
5.2.2 | Indirect trust computation by IoT entities
In Equation (7), T n Ndði; j;Cx; trÞ represents the indirect
trust of service consumer i on service provider j for the
context Cx computed based on local knowledge of node (an
entity). T n Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ represents the indirect trust updated
on the previous evaluation period, stored locally at i (repre-
senting the j past indirect trust score). T n Ndði; j;Cx; trÞ is
computed by i based on the reputation scores provided by the
recommending peers in the recent evaluation period (repre-
senting j current reputation). Ni represents the neighbourhood
of i (i.e. peers that are neighbours of node i). k ∈ Ni repre-
sents that entity k belongs to the neighbourhood of i, and Crk
represents the credibility of entity k. The credibility of the
recommender lies between 0 and 1. To meet the adaptivity
requirement and to address opportunistic attack, our trust
model considers the service provider past and current
behaviour. To address self‐promoting attacks, self‐
recommendations provided by service providers are not
considered k ≠ j in Equation (8):
T n Ndði; j;Cx; trÞ ¼
Pn
k∈Ni;k≠jR




Equation (9) represents the indirect trust calculated at time
t with support from neighbouring nodes. ω is a weighting
factor used to weight past indirect trustworthiness and recent
indirect trustworthiness, the value of which ranges between
[0–1]. T n Ndði; j;Cx; tÞ represents the indirect trust of the
service provider j, computed based on its current ðT n Nd
ði; j;Cx; trÞÞ and past behaviour ðT nNdði; j;Cx; t0ÞÞ (Equa-
tion 9). To address the time‐sensitivity requirement, the past
and present behaviour of service providers is considered:
T n Ndði; j;Cx; tÞ ¼ ωT n Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ
þ ð1 − ωÞ T n Ndði; j;Cx; trÞ
ð9Þ
5.3 | Reputation computation by an IoT
entity based on local knowledge only
The reputation of the service provider should be based on
current and past behaviour. If more weight is given to past
behaviour relative to current behaviour or the present behav-
iour is not considered, then calculated trustworthiness would
not be accurate.
The reputation ðT ði; j;Cx; tÞÞ of service provider j is
computed by service consumer i based on local knowledge
only (in Equation 10) using direct ðT dði; j;Cx; tÞÞ and indirect
trust ðT n Ndði; j; Cx;tÞÞ. β is used as a weighting factor to
weight direct and indirect trust. The lower value of β means
giving more weight to indirect trust:





5.4 | Global trust computation by kingpin
After the expiry of every recent evaluation period, the IoT
entities share the trust table containing the direct trust value
for each service provider with which they interacted during
the evaluation period. The kingpin receives the fine‐grained
values (representing direct trust) from the entities who have
taken any service from any other entity (as a service provider)
in the IoT network. Let us suppose there are n service
consumers in the network who have taken service s1 one or
more times from service provider j during the current (tr)
time window. At the expiry of tr, each service consumer
computes the direct trust using Equation (4) and transmits it
to the kingpin (fog‐node).
At a kingpin, the direct trust values received in the context
Cx are stored in the recent time window represented by t
kp
r :
For time window tkpr the dimension is of the form FROM
Start TO End. The window size is represented using time units
(such as HOURS). Let tkp represent the time at which the tkpr
expires, upon which the kingpin evaluates the service provider
trustworthiness score.
Moreover, tkpr defines the recent time window that stores the
recommendations [T dð1; j; s1; trÞ… T dðn; j; s1; trÞ] received
for the service provider j in the context s1. Initially, at the first
evaluation, a default reputation score in the context s1 is assigned
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to the service provider, which is used as the value of
T kp ndðj; s1; t
kp
0 Þ. At the expiry of t
kp, T kp ndðj; s1; tÞ is assigned
to T Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ. The updated T kp ndðj; s1; tÞ value is
computed as shown in Equation (13).
At the expiry of tkp, the kingpin checks the dispersion in
the n recommendations received for a service provider j in the
context s1. If there is high dispersion in the received data
[T dð1; j; s1; t
kp
r Þ……..T dðn; j; s1; t
kp
r Þ] (i.e. σ = 1.44*Median
Absolute Deviation (MAD) [47, 48] of these values is greater
than threshold ψ), outliers are removed (leaving p recom-
mendations). MAD is more resilient to outliers in a data set
than the standard deviation.
We apply ABS (Median ± k(σ_MADR)) to detect the
outliers. The credibility of the recommender a Crkp nda Þ, who
provided such extreme recommendation, is reduced with more
points (decreased by ζ5). The credibility of other recom-
menders is updated based on the RS difference between the
recommender a with the average of recommendations pro-
vided by the p recommenders in the tkpr ; for service provider j
in the context s1 (Equation 11). After removing the extreme
values, the kingpin k computes the average ðuT dðj; s1; t
kp
r ÞÞ of
all the remaining p recommendations received from recom-
menders for service provider j in the context s1 (see
Equation 11).
As summarized in Table 1, kingpin node k computes
ranking categories of recommendation given by recom-
mender a, and uT dðj; s1; t
kp
r Þ. Kingpin node k then com-
putes the absolute ranking similarity difference between
these ranking categories (Equation 12). If the difference
between the rating categories is zero, the credibility of a will
be increased with a certain threshold ðζ1Þ. If the difference
is 1, the credibility of a will be decreased with ζ2: If the
difference is 2, it will be decreased with ζ3: If the differ-
ence between categories is 3, the credibility of a will be
decreased with ζ4: Otherwise, it will be decreased with a
threshold ζ5.
Upon inquiry by the service consumer for the specific
service provider j, the kingpin will provide the trustworthiness
values of j, representing its trustworthiness at the expiry of tkp0
and at tkpr . Global trust ðT kp ndðj; s1; tÞÞ is calculated using
Equation (13) by the kingpin node. To address self‐promoting
attack recommendation provided by the service provider for




































5.5 | Global trust computation by an IoT
entity based on local and global knowledge
As we discussed in Section 3, if a service consumer does
not find enough recommendations for a service provider
from credible neighbours, then what will happen? The
service consumer will immediately ask for the reputation of
the service provider from the kingpin. Even for better ac-
curacy in computing the reputation of the service provider,
it can query the kingpin node. At last, the reputation of
service provider j is computed by node i (using direct and
indirect trust) in Equation (17). Indirect trust is computed
based on local and global knowledge (see Equation 16). β is
used as a weighting factor to weight direct and indirect
trust. The lower value of β means giving more weight to
indirect trust.
Based on the service consumer accuracy requirement, the
indirect trust for a service provider can be computed with the
support of both neighbouring nodes and the kingpin (using
Equation 16). For indirect trust ðT NdÞ the calculation is
based on the information received from kingpin ðT kpndÞ and
indirect trust computed by the consumer node itself ðT nNdÞ
for the period t0, and tr (8). T Ndði; j;Cx; tÞ represents the
indirect trust calculated based on the past (T Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ in
Equation 14) and current behaviour (T Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ in
Equation 15).












In Equations (14) and (15), λ represents the weighting
factor to weight the indirect trust computed based on the local
knowledge ðT nNdÞ and the indirect trust score provided by the
kingpin ðT kpndÞ. The value of λ, ranges between [0,1]:
T Ndði; j;Cx; tÞ ¼ α � T Ndði; j;Cx; t0Þ þ ð1 − αÞ
� T Ndði; j;Cx; trÞ
ð16Þ





6 | EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section demonstrates that our proposed TRM protocol
addresses desirable convergence, adaptivity, survivability, as
well as resilience against malicious attacks requirements. The
experiments are performed on 50 nodes that are deployed
randomly. A discrete‐event network simulator Network
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Simulator 3 (NS‐3) [49, 50], is selected as the simulator. The
entities (nodes) interaction pattern follows the distribution
supported by the analysis of real traces specified in [9, 20, 51, 52].
The service consumer can rate the service provider between
0 and 1.
In this work, several experiments have been conducted,
and impacts of different weighting factors have been shown on
the trustworthiness of nodes. A comparison of the work has
been made with the current work [9–11, 22]. In the first three
experiments (Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3), we demonstrate that
the proposed TRM protocol addresses the adaptivity require-
ment. Afterwards, we demonstrate the survivability property of
the TRM protocol (Section 6.4). We then demonstrate the
scalability property of our TRM protocol. Lastly, in the last two
experiments, we show the network resilience against two trust‐
related attacks (bad‐mouthing and ballot‐stuffing) with
different percentages of malicious nodes.
Among existing works (related to the TRM system for IoT
and SIoT), only [10] provides experimental evidence related to
addressing the survivability requirement.
In [9, 20], experimental evidence is provided related to
addressing adaptive behaviour and fast convergence re-
quirements. The work in [20] assumes that friends are coop-
erative, and the cooperativeness value is computed as the ratio
of the number of common friends and the total number of
friends. Moreover, the social relationship between the owners
of the entities in a transaction is exploited to measure the
trustworthiness between entities. However, entities are able to
build their own social network, which may be different and
independent of their owners’ social network. Static values are
considered for representing relationships. Therefore, for
meaningful comparison, we considered [9]. A fog‐based trust
scheme is presented in [22], therefore for meaningful com-
parison related to addressing scalability requirement, we
selected it.
6.1 | Experiment 1: New user achieves
ground truth based on direct trust evaluation
In this experiment, we show that a new entity can build its
trustworthiness towards the service provider(s) with desirable
convergence behaviour. The experiment is conducted to
demonstrate that the TRM protocol addresses the adaptivity
requirement. The aim of this experiment is to show the effect
of trust parameter α (in Equation 5) on trust evaluation results
based on interactions between a service consumer and a ser-
vice provider that are randomly picked. To compare the pro-
posed scheme with the work in [9], a similar experiment is
conducted. The experimental setting is the same as that of [9].
The entities (nodes) interaction pattern follows the distribution
supported by the analysis of real traces specified in [9, 20, 51, 52].
The initial direct trust of all nodes is set to ignorance (0.5). The
average interaction frequency is approximately six times per day.
Therefore, the recent time window size (tr) is set to 2 days.When
two legitimate service consumers interact directly with a service
provider, the rating assigned may vary. For malicious service
consumer, the deviation from the ground truth is higher. The
value of α is updated by choosing three values, 0.1, 0.3, and 0.9.
Moreover, when α is less than 0.5, more weight will be given to
the direct trust computed based on recent time window
ðT dði; j;Cx; trÞÞ; when α is greater than 0.5, more weight will be
given to the direct trust updated in t0 ðT dði; j;Cx; t0ÞÞ; and
when α = 0.5, the same weight will be given to T dði; j;Cx; trÞ
and T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ. Table 2 shows the configuration parameters
for this experiment.
In Figure 3, the horizontal straight line indicates the actual
trust value derived from the ground truth. When the value of α
increases (i.e. more weight is given to the recent time window),
the trust convergence time becomes shorter. Figure 3 shows
that the presented scheme converges to ground truth more
quickly as compared to [9]. This experiment demonstrates that
giving more weight to direct trust computed by the service
consumer, based on recent interactions, will allow correct
learning of the behaviour of service providers.
6.2 | Experiment 2: Adaptive behaviour of
recommenders
The experiment is conducted to demonstrate that the TRM
protocol addresses the adaptivity requirement. This experiment
shows how well our proposed scheme identifies the discrimi-
natory behaviour of a recommender (discriminatory attack)
and is equipped with the mechanism to address it. This
experiment shows the change in 10 recommender entities’
credibilities with different proportions of malicious entities.
The X‐axis represents the entity (node) number, and the Y‐axis
represents the proportion of malicious entities. All the
recommender entities are providing recommendations to ser-
vice consumer with identity 11. The experiment is based on
indirect trust. In each round, the proportion of malicious en-
tities increases. Initially, the proportion of malicious entities is
0.1, and therefore node 1 is set to be the malicious node.
Afterwards, the proportion of malicious nodes is increased to
0.2, and therefore node 1 remained malicious and 2 is set to
malicious. Finally, the proportion of malicious nodes is
increased to 0.5, nodes 1 to 4 remains malicious, and node 5 is
set to malicious. In all rounds, nodes 6 through 10 exhibited
good behaviour. The good recommender nodes provide
TABLE 2 Simulation configuration parameters for Experiment 1
Parameters Value
Initial trust value of nodes 0.5
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trustworthiness between [0.83, 0.9] and malicious recom-
mender nodes in the range [0, 0.2].
The trustworthiness of the entity as a recommendation
source (referred to as credibility) is an important parameter in a
trust model. The credibility of the malicious recommender is
decreased with each malicious attempt, which allows the
convergence of service provider trustworthiness to the ground
truth in the presence of malicious nodes. The values of the
parameters required for computing recommender k’s credi-
bility are as follows: ζ1 is set to +5%, ζ2 to −5%, ζ3 to −10%,
and ζ4 to −15%. Considering Table 1, if the difference between
the rating categories is zero, the credibility of recommender k
will be increased within a certain threshold (5%) (considering
Equation 7). If the difference is 1, it will be decreased by −5%.
If the difference is 2, it will be decreased by −10%. If the
difference between categories is 3, the credibility of recom-
mender k will be decreased by −15% points.
Figure 4 shows the results using our proposed scheme.
It is obvious to see that when a recommender entity pro-
vides a false recommendation, there will be a decrease in its
credibility, and the credibility of a good behaviour node will
increase in every round. In our presented scheme, the
credibility of a node is decreased based on the amount of
RS difference.
6.3 | Experiment 3: Addressing adaptive
behaviour of the service provider
(opportunistic service attack)
The experiment is conducted to demonstrate that the TRM
protocol addresses the adaptivity requirement. Like the work in
[11], a set of experiments is conducted to demonstrate that our
proposed scheme identifies the changing behaviour of a service
provider (opportunistic service attack) and is equipped with the
mechanism to address it. Our scheme allows the service con-
sumer to select a service provider based on current behaviour
or on a combination of both past and present. To meet the
adaptivity requirement and to address opportunistic attack, our
trust model considers the service provider past and current
behaviour. This helps service consumers determine the change
in service provider behaviour if modified.
The service consumer has a maximum of 40 neighbours.
We assume that their interaction pattern follows the distribu-
tion supported by the analysis of many real traces [9, 20, 51, 52].
For two nodes, we consider that the average inter‐contact
interaction frequency is approximately six times per day.
Therefore, the recent time window size (tr) is set to six in-
teractions, and the duration of tr is set to 1 day.
The trustworthiness of the service provider is computed
based on direct trust. In this set of experiments, alpha (α) is
used as a weighting factor that weights the previous direct
trust value computed at the expiry of the previous time win-
dow (t0), and recent direct trust value computed based on the
contents in the recent time window(tr). Moreover, when α is
less than 0.5, more weight will be given to the direct trust
computed based on recent time window ðT dði; j;Cx; trÞÞ;
when α is greater than 0.5, more weight will be given to the
direct trust updated in t0 ðT dði; j;Cx; t0ÞÞ; and when α = 0.5,
the same weight will be given to T dði; j;Cx; trÞ and
T dði; j;Cx; t0Þ. Figure 5a shows the service provider milking
behaviour. In this scenario, a node first builds its reputation,
and after a period of time (making its reputation), it provides
low QoS due to malicious intent or because of a lack of re-
sources. Up to the 25th day, the outcome of the interaction is
highly satisfactory (the service provider is providing good
F I GURE 3 Effect of trust parameter α on direct trust evaluation (Comparison of our scheme with [9])
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QoS, i.e. between [0.88, 0.92]). After the 25th day, the outcome
of the interaction is dissatisfactory—that is, the QoS provided
by the service provider lies in the range [0, 0.2]. Figure 5b
shows that with the passage of time, the service provider
improves its service quality. Up to the 25th day, the outcome of
the interaction is dissatisfactory and lies in the range [0, 0.2],
and after the 25th day, the outcome of the interaction is highly
satisfactory, that is, between [0.88, 0.92]. For accuracy, it
F I GURE 4 Change in recommender node credibility with different proportions of malicious nodes
F I GURE 5 Addressing adaptive behaviour of the service provider (Opportunistic service attack). (a) Milking behaviour of a service provider, (b) Building
behaviour of a service provider and (c) Oscillating behaviour of service provider
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necessitates consideration of both the past and recent
behaviour of the service provider while calculating the trust-
worthiness of a service provider. The results show that the
proposed scheme quickly adapts to the changing behaviour of
the service provider.
Figure 5c shows the oscillating behaviour of a service
provider separately. With this type of behaviour, a node be-
haves bad and good, performing badly for 10 days and then
good for 10 days. In all experiments, the peers are required to
provide recommendations based on current and past experi-
ence. It can be seen from Figure 5a,b and c; our scheme is able
to detect the changing behaviour of service provider with the
help of implementing the concept of time windows.
6.4 | Experiment 4: Achieving survivability
by removing the impact of malicious users on
the trustworthiness of the service provider
In this experiment, among 40 recommender nodes, 20% show
malicious behaviour regarding a well‐behaving service pro-
vider. Simulation configuration parameters are set as specified
in [10]. The proposed protocol provides protection against this
attack by building and updating the credibility of recommender
nodes.
In [10], the credibility of a recommender entity is updated
based on the quality of recommendation scores. When a ma-
licious entity regularly provides unfair recommendations, its
credibility is continuously decreased and finally becomes zero,
and that any recommendation provided by an entity whose
credibility is zero will be weighted with zero.
As shown in Figure 6, without considering the credibility,
the trust level of an honest service provider is badly affected.
The service provider trust level is initially decreased, but the
system quickly recovers its trustworthiness by reducing the
credibility of malicious nodes. It shows the comparison of our
approach with [10]. Table 3 shows the configuration parame-
ters for this experiment. It can be seen from Figure 6 that our
approach impacts the reputation of a service provider in the
presence of malicious users less adversely compared to the
work presented in [10]. Furthermore, it allows for quick
convergence to ground truth by reducing the credibility of
recommenders that perform maliciously over a certain period
of times. The results show that the trustworthiness of the
service provider converges to the ground truth with the pas-
sage of time in the presence of malicious nodes. Figure 6,
demonstrates that if we give more weightage (β) to direct trust
(considering Equation 10) compared to indirect trust then it
F I GURE 6 Achieving survivability: Removing the impact of malicious users on the trustworthiness of the service provider (comparison with [10])
TABLE 3 Simulation configuration parameters for Experiment 4
Parameters Value
Initial credibility of recommender nodes 1
Total nodes 40
Malicious recommender nodes 20%, 8 nodes
Fair rating 1
False rating 0
Alpha (proposed)/Theta [10] 0.7
Lemda [10] 0.5
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allows quick convergence to the ground truth. The weight
(τ = 0.6) represents that while computing the credibility of
recommender k, more weightage is given to k’s rating behav-
iour similarity with the service consumer i in context Cx
(Equation 7). Less weightage (τ = 0.4) is given to recommender
k rating behaviour similarity with the average ðuRT dðj;Cx;trÞÞ of all
the recommendations received from neighbour recommenders
for service provider j in the contextCx (in Equation 7). The value
of the parameters required for computing credibility are set as
follows: ζ1 is set to þ 5%; ζ2 to −5%; ζ3 to −10%; and ζ4
to −15%: Considering Table 1, if the difference between the
rating categories is zero, the credibility of recommender kwill be
increased within a certain threshold (5%) points (in Equation 7).
If the difference is 1, it will be decreased by −5%. If the differ-
ence is 2, it will be decreased by−10%. If the difference between
categories is 3, the credibility of recommender k will be
decreased by −15% points. Otherwise, will be decreased with a
threshold of −20%.
6.5 | Experiment 5: Addressing scalability
requirement
In this experiment, we demonstrate the scalability property of
our proposed TRMprotocol. In this experiment, we assume that
a network node takes services from a service provider in a similar
context. Upon taking service, the node gives a rating about a
service provider based on the QoS received. The nodes inter-
action pattern follows the distribution supported by the analysis
of real traces specified in [9, 20, 51, 52]. The initial direct trust of
all nodes is set to ignorance (0.5). The average interaction fre-
quency is approximately six times per day. Therefore, the recent
time window size (tr) is set to 2 days. In this work, we have
considered the time‐driven scheme to update the trust score. A
temporal data reduction scheme is presented to reduce the total
amount of data uploaded to the fog servers. At the expiry of tr,
each service consumer node computes the direct trust based on
the ratings stored in the tr and sends it to the fog server (kingpin).
In contrast, in [10, 22] information (rating given to service
provider after an interaction) is sent to the central location
without in‐network processing. In [10, 22], each interaction
rating is sent to the central location (cloud), whereas in [22], each
interaction rating is sent to the fog server. It can be seen in
Figure 7 that because of in‐network processing, our scheme
generates less overhead relative to [10, 22].
6.6 | Experiment 6: Addressing bad‐
mouthing attack
Figure 8 illustrates the effect of bad‐mouthing on the trust-
worthiness of a service provider with different percentages of
malicious nodes. This experiment is conducted over a network
of 50 nodes. The experiment shows the results of bad‐
mouthing attack on a single service provider having a peer
range of 40 nodes. All the 40 service consumers are providing
recommendations about a service provider in a similar context.
We compared our results with the average of recommendations
provided by non‐malicious users (termed as normal trust in
Figure 8a,b and c).
F I GURE 7 Communication overhead versus network size
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The weight of each recommendation is given on the
basis of the credibility of the recommender node. In addi-
tion, the recommending entities are required to report both
the past and the current behaviour of the service provider.
On each round, the number of malicious peers increases.
The peers who are malicious remain malicious till the end.
The good recommender nodes provide trustworthiness be-
tween [0.83, 0.9] and malicious recommender nodes in the
range [0, 0.2].
Figure 8a,b and c show that as the percentage of malicious
nodes increases, the trustworthiness of the node as a service
provider decreases. The proposed scheme does not allow the
dishonest nodes to highly degrade the trustworthiness of the
service provider by using the credibility factor of the recom-
mender nodes.
The results show that the scheme does not allow malicious
users to highly impact the trustworthiness of the service pro-
vider in the presence of malicious users up to 40%. If there are
more malicious peers in the neighbourhood and more
weightage is given to the indirect trust (10), then it will impact
the reputation score of the trustworthy service provider more.
In Figure 8a , with β = 0.2, more weightage is given to indirect
trust (10). It can be seen in Figure 8a, when τ = 0.2 and the
percentage of malicious nodes increases, the service provider’s
trustworthiness is affected more. In Figure 8a, the weighting
factor (τ = 0.2) represents that while computing the credibility
of recommender k, more weightage is given to recommender k
rating behaviour similarity with the average (uRT dðj;Cx;trÞ) of all
the recommendations received from neighbour recommenders
for service provider j in the context Cx (7). As shown in
Figure 8c, if there are more malicious peers in the neigh-
bourhood, accuracy is improved if, while computing recom-
mender credibility, more weight (τ = 0.8) is given to rating
behaviour similarity between the recommender and service
consumer (Equation 7). It can be seen from Figure 8a,b and c,
as τ decreases and the number of malicious users increases, the
trustworthiness of the service provider is impacted more.
Figure 8a illustrates that if more or equal weight is given to
direct trust, the service provider trustworthiness is not
impacted much.
6.7 | Experiment 7: Addressing ballot‐
stuffing attack
Figure 9 illustrates the effect of ballot‐stuffing on the trust-
worthiness of a service provider with different percentages of
malicious nodes.
This experiment is conducted over a network of 40 nodes.
The experiment shows the results of a ballot‐stuffing attack on
F I GURE 8 Addressing bad‐mouthing attack. (a) τ ¼ 0:2; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8, (b) τ ¼ 0:5; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8 and (c) τ ¼ 0:8; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8
F I GURE 9 Addressing ballot‐stuffing attack. (a) τ ¼ 0:2; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8, (b) τ ¼ 0:5; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8 and (c) τ ¼ 0:8; β¼ 0:2; 0:5; 0:8
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a single node having a peer’s range of 40 nodes. The non‐
malicious recommender nodes provide the trustworthiness
score between [0, 0.2] and malicious recommender nodes in
the range [0.83, 1]. In addition, the recommending entities are
required to report both the past and current behaviour of the
service provider.
In this set of experiments, when β > 0.5, more weightage is
given to direct trust (in Equation 10). When τ < 0.5, while
computing the credibility of recommender k, more weightage
is given to recommender k rating behaviour similarity with the
average (uRT dðj;Cx;trÞ) of all the recommendations received
from neighbour recommenders for service provider j in the
context Cx (Equation 7). It can be seen in Figure 9 that as τ
decreases and the number of malicious nodes increases, the
trustworthiness of the service provider is impacted (raised)
more. The results in Figure 9a show that the TRM protocol
does not allow malicious users to highly raise the trustwor-
thiness of the service provider in the presence of malicious
users.
7 | CONCLUSION AND REMARKS ON
THE FUTURE
With IoT’s growing market, service consumers face problems
associated with picking the most reliable service provider or
service. Evaluating strangers’ service providers’ trustworthi-
ness in IoT systems has become an important issue. Trust
mechanisms stimulate cooperation among distributed entities.
The TRM system is considered in IoT for providing qualified
services and facilitating IoT entities, detecting malfunctions,
and establishing proper collaborations. The risks of in-
teractions are greatly reduced by TRM systems by helping
consumers evaluate service provider quality before trans-
actions. Because of the high impact of TRM systems, attacks
that attempt to mislead service consumer decisions through
dishonest recommendations are popular. Service providers
may provide service with varying quality over time, periodically,
or randomly.
This paper proposes a trust‐based attack‐resistant trust
model for fog‐based IoT. The proposed trust model is
equipped with mechanisms to meet some requirements of the
TRM system for the IoT environment, including survivability,
adaptivity, and scalability. The potential benefits of the pro-
posed TRM scheme for managing trust and reputation re-
lationships are analysed through simulation results. The
proposed scheme is robust against several attacks on the TRM
system. We have considered the following five trust‐related
attacks that can disrupt the TRM system: self‐promoting,
bad‐mouthing, ballot‐stuffing, opportunistic service, and
discriminatory.
The published studies provide no explicit support con-
cerning the interoperability of different TRMs on fog‐nodes.
Many research problems remain unresolved in the design and
development of TRM protocols for IoT systems—for
example, privacy, context awareness, interoperability between
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